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Greening Cloud-Enabled Big Data Storage Foren-
sics: Syncany as a Case Study 
Yee-Yang Teing, Ali Dehghantanha, Senior Member, IEEE, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Senior 
Member, IEEE, Mohd Taufik Abdullah, and Zaiton Muda 
Abstract—The pervasive nature of cloud-enabled big data storage solutions introduces new challenges in the identification, 
collection, analysis, preservation and archiving of digital evidences. Investigation of such complex platforms to locate and 
recover traces of criminal activities is a time-consuming process. Hence, cyber forensics researchers are moving towards 
streamlining the investigation process by locating and documenting residual artefacts (evidences) of forensic value of users’ 
activities on cloud-enabled big data platforms in order to reduce the investigation time and resources involved in a real-world 
investigation.  In this paper, we seek to determine the data remnants of forensic value from Syncany private cloud storage 
service, a popular storage engine for big data platforms. We demonstrate the types and the locations of the artefacts that can be 
forensically recovered. Findings from this research contribute to an in-depth understanding of cloud-enabled big data storage 
forensics, which can result in reduced time and resources spent in real-world investigations involving Syncany-based cloud 
platforms. 
Index Terms— Green forensics, big data forensics, cloud forensics, Syncany forensics 
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
ig data and cloud computing are two information and 
communications technology (ICT) trends in recent 
years. For example, a 2013 survey by the International 
Data Corporation (IDC) predicted that the cloud compu-
ting spending will exceed USD 107 billion and will drive 
17% of the IT product expenditures by 2017 [1]. Gartner 
[2] also predicted that the cloud computing market will 
be worth more than USD 1.1 trillion by 2017 as more big 
data platforms and big data analytical solutions are de-
ployed over cloud storage services. 
There are, however, situations where public clouds are 
not suitable to host the big data platforms (e.g. inade-
quate privacy protection for data). Public cloud users are 
often billed for the resources consumed, including the 
storage input output (I/O), CPUs and memory, and the 
cost can become prohibitively expensive in storing, ac-
cessing and analysing high velocity, variety, veracity, and 
volume data. There were also concerns about Cloud Ser-
vice providers (CSPs) being able to infer or profile users 
based on the hosted/stored data [3],[4],[5]. Thus, it is un-
surprising that cloud and big data security and privacy 
are current research focus 
[6],[7],[8],[9],[10],[11],[12],[13],[14]. Data owners in indus-
tries such as healthcare and banking are also subject to 
exacting regulatory requirements, which restrict the out-
sourcing of the data for storage and analysis. The con-
cerns are compounded in the recent leakage of the PRISM 
and MUSCULAR surveillance programs that allegedly 
enable government and law enforcement agencies to tap 
into CSPs’ data centres without a search warrant [15]. 
Therefore, in-house private dedicated cloud storage ser-
vices have become an ideal solution for big data plat-
forms. 
The capability to collect evidence from the cloud has 
real-world implications for both criminal investigations 
and civil litigations [16]. For example, due to the nature of 
cloud-enabled big data storage solutions (e.g. data physi-
cally stored in distributed servers), identification of resid-
ual evidences may be a ‘finding a needle in a haystack’ 
exercise [17],[18],[19],[20]. Even if the data could be locat-
ed, traditional evidence collection tools, techniques and 
practices are unlikely to be adequate [21]. These challeng-
es are compounded in cross-jurisdictional investigations, 
which could prohibit the transfer of evidential data due to 
the lack of cross-nation legislative agreements in place 
[22],[23],[24],[25]. Overcoming these investigation chal-
lenges demands significant time and resources of an in-
vestigation team [26].  
In this paper, we extend our previous work [27]1 seek-
ing to identify potential artefacts that remain on the client 
devices and cloud servers involving the use of Syncany as 
a private cloud storage solution supporting big-data plat-
forms. We attempt to answer the following questions: 
 
 
1 This paper is an extended version of an earlier published conference 
paper [27], with more than 50% new content. 
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1. What residual artefacts can be recovered from the hard 
disk and memory after using the Syncany desktop clients, 
and the locations of the data remnants on a Windows 8.1, 
Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS (Ubuntu), and Mac OS X Mavericks 
10.9.5 (Mac OS) client device? 
2. What data of forensic interest can be recovered from a 
cloud server hosting Syncany private cloud storage ser-
vice and the location of the data remnants on an Ubuntu 
14.04.1 LTS server? 
3. What data of forensic interest can be collected from the 
network traffic communications between the Syncany 
clients and servers? 
We describe related works and Syncany private cloud 
service in the next two sections, respectively. Section 4 
outlines our research methodology and experiment envi-
ronment setup. In Sections 5 and 6, we discuss findings 
from the analysis of Syncany clients and servers, respec-
tively. Section 7 summarises the research findings. Final-
ly, in Section 8, we conclude the paper and outline poten-
tial future research areas. 
2 RELATED WORK  
Due to the underlying legal challenges and complexity 
involved in cross-jurisdictional cloud forensic investiga-
tions, Marty [28] and Shields et al. [29] proposed a proac-
tive application-level logging mechanism to log infor-
mation of forensic interest which can also be used in inci-
dent response. Forensic researchers such as Dykstra and 
Sherman [30], Gebhardt
 
and Reiser [31], Quick et al. [24], 
and Martini and Choo [32] have also presented frame-
works and prototype implementations to support collec-
tion of evidential materials using Application Program-
ming Interfaces (API) from a variety of cloud storage plat-
forms. Although data collection using APIs could poten-
tially reduce interactions with the CSPs, it could be lim-
ited by the APIs’ feature sets [32]. 
In our earlier work [33],[34], we studied the integrity of 
data downloaded from the web and desktop clients of 
Dropbox, Google Drive, Skydrive, and Symform, and 
identified that the act of downloading data from client 
applications does not tamper the contents of the files, de-
spite changes in the file creation/modification 
timestamps. Other cloud applications such as Evernote 
[35], Amazon S3 [35], Dropbox [35], [36], Google Drive 
[35], [37], Microsoft Skydrive [38], Amazon Cloud Drive 
[39], BitTorrent Sync [40], SugarSync [41], Ubuntu One 
[42], huBic [43], Syncany [27], Symform [34], as well as 
mobile cloud apps [45], [46] have also been examined. 
These forensics studies located artefacts of client applica-
tions from the user settings and application data resided 
on the media storage through keyword search. Quick and 
Choo [36],[37],[38] also identified that data erasing tools 
such as Eraser and CCleaner do not completely remove 
the data remnants from Dropbox, Google Drive, and Mi-
crosoft SkyDrive.  
The first cloud forensic framework was proposed by 
Martini and Choo [47], which was derived based upon 
the frameworks of McKemmish [48] and NIST [49]. The 
framework was used to investigate ownCloud [50], Ama-
zon EC2 [51], VMWare [32], and XtreemFS [52]. Quick et 
al. [24] further extended and validated the four-stage 
framework using SkyDrive, Dropbox, Google Drive, and 
ownCloud. Chung et al. [35] proposed a methodology for 
cloud investigation on Windows, Mac OS, iOS, and An-
droid devices. The methodology was then used to inves-
tigate Amazon S3, Google Docs, and Evernote. Scanlon et 
al. [53] outlined a methodology for remote acquisition of 
evidence from decentralised file synchronisation network 
which utilised to investigate BitTorrent Sync [40], [54]. In 
another study, we proposed a methodology for investi-
gating the newer BitTorrent Sync application (version 2.0) 
or any third party or Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) applications [55]. Do et al. proposed an adversary 
model for digital forensics, and they demonstrated how 
such an adversary model can be used to investigate mo-
bile devices and apps [56] and Android smartwatches 
[57]. Ab Rahman et al. [58], on the other hand, proposed a 
conceptual forensic-by-design framework to integrate 
forensics tools and best practices in the development of 
cloud systems. Tzuen et.al. [26], discussed about oppor-
tunities and challenges in streamlining digital investiga-
tion by referring to research that identified and docu-
mented residual artefacts. 
The majority of existing published work in the field of 
cloud forensics have focused on client investigations on 
public cloud infrastructures. This paper is one of few 
studies which focus on both client and server forensics. 
Such a study may assist in reducing the carbon footprints 
of investigation cases involving private cloud storage so-
lutions. 
3 BACKGROUND 
Syncany is a popular open source and cross-platform 
cloud storage solution written in Java and supports data 
storage on different backend media (e.g., FTP, Box.net, 
WebDAV and SFTP, Amazon S3, Google Storage, IMAP, 
Local, Picasa and Rackspace Cloud Files). Hence, it does 
not require a server-side software [59]. In Syncany, the 
data synchronisation is facilitated by the sync link or re-
po2 URL. This is similar to the concept of BitTorrent Sync, 
with the difference being that Syncany uses a central stor-
age infrastructure. Syncany encrypts (by default) the sync 
files locally using 128-bit AES/GCM encryption algo-
rithm before uploading the sync files to the central 
(offsite) storage; hence, only clients in possession of the 
password can access the repositories. The data model 
consists of the following [59]: 
 Versioning: Syncany captures different versions of 
a file and keeps track of the changes using metada-
ta such as date, time, size and checksums. There 
are three primary versioning concepts, which are 
database versions, file histories, and file versions. 
A database version represents the point in time 
when the file tree is captured. Each database ver-
 
 
2 In Syncany, a repository (commonly known as a repo) refers to a 
dumb storage i.e., a folder that stores the packaged data and metadata 
about a sync folder in the backend system [59]. 
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sion contains a list of file histories, representing the 
identity of a file. Each file history contains a collec-
tion of file versions, representing the incarnations 
of a file. 
 Deduplication/Chunking: Syncany uses data 
deduplication technique to break individual files 
into small chunks on the client. The chunks are 
represented in data blobs (each about 8-32 KB in 
size), which are identified by their checksums. 
 Multichunking: Individual chunks are grouped in-
to multichunks, compressed and encrypted before 
being uploaded to the offsite storage. 
Fig. 1 shows an example of logical data model of a Syn-
cany repository. The entities are stored locally in the form 
of plain-old-Java-object (POJOs) in the 
org.syncany.database package and tables are stored in the 
local HSQLDB-based database in .XML format [60]. 
Syncany uses a command line interface by default, but 
the users can manually install a plugin which supports 
Graphical User Interface (GUI). Syncany commands of 
forensic relevance are as follows [61]: 
 sy init: To initialise the repository for a new sync 
folder. It creates a sync-folder-specific config.xml 
and repo file. The former holds the local configura-
tion information while the latter contains the 
chunking/crypto details required to initialise the 
remote repository. This command also generates 
the sync link in two formats: a commonly used en-
crypted link structured such as syn-
cany://storage/1/<master-salt>/<encrypted-config>, 
where both <master-salt> and <encrypted-config> 
are base58 encoded; a plaintext link structured 
such as syncany://storage/1/not-encrypted/<plaintext-
config>, where the <plaintext-config> is a base58-
encoded representation of the storage/connection 
config. 
 sy connect: To connect to an existing repository us-
ing the sync link or manually using the repo URL. 
This command is similar to sy init, with the differ-
ence being that it downloads the repo files from a 
remote storage. 
 sy status: Lists changes made to the local sync files 
by comparing the local file tree (e.g., last modified 
dates and file sizes) with the local database. 
 sy up: Detects changes in the local sync directory 
(using the ‘sy status’ command), indexes new files 
and uploads changes to the remote repository (us-
ing the ‘sy up’ command). File changes are pack-
aged into new multichunks and uploaded to an 
offsite storage, alongside the delta metadata data-
base. 
 sy ls-remote: Queries the remote storage and lists 
the client database versions that have not yet been 
downloaded/processed. 
 sy down: Detects file changes made by other clients 
(as identified by the ‘sy ls-remote’ command). The 
command first downloads the metadata of rele-
vance. Then, it evaluates which multichunks are 
changed or required. Finally, it downloads and ar-
ranges the multichunks according to the vector 
clocks, if necessary. 
4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Similar to our previous approaches [27], [34], 
[36],[37],[38], [55],   our test environments consist of four 
(4) VMware Workstations (VMs), one (1) for server and 
three (3) for desktop clients – see TABLE 1. The VMs were 
hosted using VMware Fusion Professional version 7.0.0 
(2103067) on a Macbook Pro (Late 2012) running Mac OS 
X Mavericks 10.9.5, with a 2.6GHz Intel Core i7 processor 
and 16GB of RAM. 
The 3111th email message of the Berkeley Enron email dat
aset (downloaded from http://bailando.sims.berkeley.edu/enr
on_email.html) were used to create a set of sample files 
and saved in .RTF, .TXT, .DOCX, .JPG (print screen), .ZIP, 
and .PDF formats, providing a basis for replication of the 
experiments in future. The set of sample files were placed 
in a new directory on the clients’ workstations, before 
being uploaded to the servers, and subsequently down-
loaded to the corresponding client devices. It is notewor-
thy that the Syncany application does not require an ac-
 
 
Fig. 1. Logical data model of a Syncany repository (Adapted from [59]). 
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count, and hence no user account was created. 
In our experiments, we conducted a predefined set of 
activities to simulate various real world scenarios of using 
Syncany private cloud storage service. These included 
installation and uninstallation of the client applications as 
well as accessing, uploading, downloading, viewing, de-
leting, and unsyncing the sync files. A snapshot was un-
dertaken of the VM workstations prior to and after each 
experiment. Wireshark was deployed on the host ma-
chine to capture the communication network traffic. For 
the purpose of this research, we used WebDAV as the 
carrying protocol to enable the study of the network’s 
inner workings. Other forensic tools prepared for the ex-
periments are presented in TABLE 2. The experiments 
were repeated thrice (at different dates) to ensure con-
sistency of findings. 
The reliability of digital evidences rests upon the ability 
of the practitioners to adhere to generally accepted prin-
ciples, standards, guidelines, procedures, and best prac-
tices [49], [62]. In this research, the cloud forensics 
framework of Martini and Choo [47] was used to guide 
our investigations: 
1. Evidence source identification and preservation. We identi-
fied the physical hardware of interest, which contained 
the virtual disk (VMDK) and memory (VMEM) files in 
each VM folder. Then, we created a forensic copy of the 
VMDK and VMEM files in E01 container and raw image 
file (dd) formats respectively. For all the forensic images 
created, we calculated the MD5 and SHA1 hash values for 
each original copy and subsequently verified for each 
working copy.  
2. Collection. We extracted test data that matched the 
search terms ‘syncany’ and ‘enron’ in the hard disk imag-
es. These included SQLite databases, Apple Property List 
(PLIST) files, event logs, shortcuts, thumbnail caches, and 
Windows’ Prefetch, $MFT, $LogFile and $UsnJrnl files. 
Data from the physical memory dumps were collected 
using Volatility, Photorec file carver, and HxD Hex Edi-
tor; network traffic were captured using Wireshark and 
Netminer. Similar to the first stage, for all the extracted 
files, we calculated the MD5 and SHA1 hash values for 
each original copy and subsequently verified for each 
working copy. 
3. Examination and analysis. This phase is concerned with 
the assessment and extraction of the evidential infor-
mation from the collected data. We seek to recover the 
following artefacts of evidential value from the client de-
vices: 
 Sync and file management metadata – The prop-
erty information generated by the Syncany client to 
facilitate the synchronisation process with the 
hardware hosting the cloud environment. These 
include the node/peer IDs, usernames, device 
names, folder/file IDs, share keys (if any), and oth-
er property information that can facilitate file-to-
device/file-to-user mappings. 
 Authentication and encryption metadata – Arte-
facts describing the encryption algorithm, pub-
lic/private keys or certificates, encryption salt, ini-
tialization vectors (IVs), password hashes, login 
URL, and (possibly) plaintext credentials that 
could provide the opportunity to login to the user’s 
online account or undertake offline brute-force at-
tacks to obtain the login password.   
 Cloud transaction logs – Records of user actions 
made to the cloud instance, such as installation and 
uninstallation of client applications, user account 
creation, logging in and off the web/client applica-
tion, as well as file upload, download, modifica-
tion, and deletion. The records are often accompa-
nied by the directory paths and timestamp infor-
mation which are useful for timeline analysis. 
 Data storage – Actual storage or temporary hold-
ing place (e.g., the application generated 
sync/archive folders, OS and web browser’s 
thumbnail caches, trash folders, and unallocated 
space) that may be relied upon for recovering the 
synced files in case the cloud environment is not 
accessible or the actual copies of sync files have 
been deleted. 
 Network captures – Network captures provide 
copies of network packets transmitted between the 
TABLE 1 
 SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS FOR SYNCANY FORENSICS 
Server configurations Client configurations 
Ubuntu Server 
Operating system : Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS 
Virtual memory size: 1GB 
Virtual storage size: 20GB 
Web application: Apache 2 
Storage type: WebDAV 
Database server: HSQL Database Engine 2.3.0 
IP address/URL: http://172.16.38.180/webdav 
Windows Client 
Operating system: Windows 8.1 Professional (Service Pack 2, 64-bit, build 9600). 
Virtual memory size: 2GB 
Virtual storage size: 20GB 
Client application: Syncany 0.4.6-alpha 
Plugins installed: WebDAV and GUI 
Ubuntu Client 
Operating system: Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS 
Virtual memory size: 1GB 
Virtual storage size: 20GB 
Client application: Syncany 0.4.6-alpha 
Plugins installed: WebDAV and GUI 
Mac OS Client 
Operating system: Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5 
Virtual memory size: 1GB 
Virtual storage size: 60GB 
Client application: Syncany 0.4.6-alpha 
Plugins installed: WebDAV and GUI 
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client and the hardware hosting the cloud envi-
ronment, which may contain digital fingerprints of 
cloud transaction events including the logi-
cal/physical locations of the correspondents/cloud 
hosting environment, timestamps of file synchroni-
sation processes, and other network signatures. 
Network traffic analysis is particularly pertinent 
when the network traffic are unencrypted as this 
may provide the opportunity to recover the data 
exchanged between computers in the network, 
such as synced files and credential information 
[63],[64],[65]. 
 Volatile memory dumps – Cloud usage always 
leaves traces in the physical memory, which could 
turn out to be information of value in criminal in-
vestigations. As demonstrated by the findings from 
[64], [66], it may be necessary to collect volatile 
memory dumps as a potential source of residual 
artefacts contributing to an extended investigation 
of above mentioned items [67]. 
We seek to recover the following artefacts of evidential 
value from the server: 
 Administrative and file management metadata 
– The server application generated instances that 
provide copies of the sync and file management 
as well as authentication and encryption metada-
ta of the clients. 
 Cloud logging and authentication data: Records 
of cloud transaction and authentication 
events/requests made by the clients to the cloud 
hosting instance, which are often accompanied 
with identifying information such as node IDs, 
logical addresses, session IDs, and timestamps 
that will facilitate provenance determination. 
 Data repositories - The data uploaded by the us-
ers to the server, which may assist a practitioner 
in recovering the synced files from the cloud 
hosting environment. 
4. Reporting and presentation. This final phase relates to the 
preparation and presentation of the information resulting 
from the analysis phase. As observed by Cahyani et al. 
[68],[69],[70], it is important for forensics examiners to 
articulate and explain complex and technical forensic 
terminologies to the judiciary and juries in order for them 
to understand “how these crimes were committed, what 
digital evidence is and where it may exist, and how the 
process of digital evidence collection was undertaken by 
the forensic investigators” [71]. 
5 EVIDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE SYNCANY DESK-
TOP CLIENTS 
An inspection of the directory listings determined that 
artefacts of the Syncany client could be predominantly 
located in the (hidden) ‘.syncany’ directory specific to the 
sync folders as well as user-specific  ‘Syncany’ directo-
ry in %Users%\<User Profile>\AppData\Roaming\, /home/
<User Profile>/.config/, and /Users/<User Profile>/.config/ on 
the Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OSX clients (respective-
ly). The former stores folder-specific configurations and 
caches while the latter manages the user-specific configu-
rations. Both the ‘.syncany’ and ‘syncany’ directories re-
mained after uninstallation of the client applications [59]. 
5.1 Sync and File Management Metadata 
Analysis of the user-specific ‘Syncany’ directory located 
the last used Process Identification (PID) for the daemon 
process in the /%syncany%/daemon.pid file. The PID could 
be useful information for file-to-process mapping i.e., 
dumping the in-memory data storage and synced files 
from the memory space of the Syncany process using the 
‘memdump’ function of Volatility. Within the 
/%syncany%/daemon.xml file we located a list of directory 
paths for the sync folders and information about whether 
the sync folders were enabled in the ‘path’ and ‘enabled’ 
attributes of the ‘folders’ property. The folder metadata is 
meant for the daemon process to identify the sync direc-
tories [59].  
Examination of the %.syncany%/config.xml file revealed 
the 20-character machine and display names, in the ‘ma-
TABLE 2 
 TOOLS PREPARED FOR SYNCANY FORENSICS 
Tool Usage 
FTK Imager Version 3.2.0.0 To create a forensic image of the .VMDK files. 
dd version 1.3.4-1 To produce a bit-for-bit image of the .VMEM files. 
Autopsy 3.1.1 To produce directory listings for the forensic images as well as extracting files and analysing the Windows Registry, swap 
file/partition, and unallocated space from the forensic images. 
HxD Version 1.7.7.0 To conduct keyword searches in the forensic images. 
Volatility 2.4 To extract the running processes and network record from the physical memory dumps and dumping files from the memory 
space of the Syncany client applications (i.e., using the ‘pslist’, ‘netstat’/’netscan’, and ‘memdump’ functions, respectively). 
SQLite Browser Version 3.4.0 To view the contents of SQLite database files. 
Photorec 7.0 To data carve the forensic images. 
File juicer 4.45 To extract files from files. 
Thumbcacheviewer Version 
1.0.2.7 
To examine the Windows thumbnail cache. 
Windows Event Viewer Version 
1.0 
To view the Windows event logs. 
Console Version 10.10 (543) To view log files. 
Windows File Analyser 2.6.0.0 To analyse the Windows prefetch and link files. 
NTFS Log Tracker To parse and analyse the $LogFile, $MFT, and $UsnJrnl New Technology File System (NTFS) files. 
SQL Workbench/J Build 118. To view the contents of Hyper SQL Database  (HSQLDB). 
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chineName’ and ‘displayName’ properties (respectively). 
The machine name is the random local machine name 
used to identify a client associated with a repository, 
while the display name is the human readable user name 
for given local machine [61]. The file also recorded the 
type of backend storage in use in the ‘type’ attribute of 
the ‘connection’ property. Knowing the type of backend 
storage in use may assist a practitioner to extrapolate the 
potential artefacts and search terms in an investigation 
involving the use of the Syncany cloud storage. For ex-
ample, if the WebDAV protocol is used, the web server 
logs can be a potential source of relevant information in 
the investigation. The use of the WebDAV protocol may 
also suggest the potential to include the HTTP re-
quest/response method names as part of the evidence 
search, such as ‘PROPFIND’3. 
Further details of the sync and file management 
metadata could be located in the ‘FILEVERSION_FULL’ 
table of the %.syncany%/db/local.db database. Specifically, 
we recovered the unique identifications (ID), directory 
paths, file sizes, SHA1 checksums, and permission infor-
mation (in POSIX format) for the sync folders and files 
specific to a repository in the ‘FILEHISTORY_ID’, 
‘PATH’, ‘SIZE’, ‘FILECONTENT_CHECKSUM’, and 
‘POSIXPERMS’ table fields. The file checksum infor-
mation could enable identification of a synced file outside 
the sync folder, as been moved or deleted by the user. 
5.2 Authentication and Encryption Metadata 
Within the ‘connection’ property of the 
%/.syncany%/config.xml file, we located the URL to the 
repository as well as the username and encrypted pass-
word for the backend storage in the ‘url’, ‘username’, and 
‘password’ attributes. The encrypted password could be 
potentially decrypted using the masterkey and masterkey 
salt stored in the ‘configEncryptionKey’ attribute of the 
‘userConfig’ property in the /%syncany%/config.xml file 
[61]. Having access to the backend storage could poten-
tially enable a practitioner to recover other data that 
might have been hosted on the web server. 
Upon further examination of the 
%/.syncany%/config.xml file, we located the masterkey and 
masterkey salt used to derive the AES-128 encryption key 
for the encrypted files in the repository, in the ‘key’ and 
‘salt’ attributes of the ‘masterKey’ property [61]. The latter 
is similar to that stored in the %.syncany%/master file. Alt-
hough it is computionally infeasible to reverse the mas-
terkey to derive the user password due to the implemen-
tation of the PBKDF2 HMAC-SHA1 (with 1 million itera-
tions) hashing algorithm, the masterkey could be useful 
when seeking to decrypt the encrypted files in the reposi-
tory. This is especially pertinent when the synced files 
were deleted as the practitioner could potentially recover 
caches of the (encrypted) databases and multichunks of 
synced files uploaded to the server from the hidden 
%.syncany%/cache directory, which is undeleted during 
 
 
3 In WebDAB, the ‘PROPFIND’ method is used to retrieve the proper-
ties from a web resource [72]. 
uninstallation of the client applications and often unno-
ticed by the user. 
With the masterkey and encrypted file in place, along 
with the random salt available in the 20th to 31st byte of 
the file header (of the encrypted file), the practitioner 
could work on deriving the encryption key using the 
HKDF key derivation function (with SHA256). The en-
cryption key, when derived and combined with the ran-
dom initialization vector available in the 32nd to 43th byte 
of the file header (of the encrypted file), could then be 
used to decrypt the ciphertext (from byte 76th of the en-
crypted file) using the default AES-128 (GCM mode) en-
cryption algorithm [61]. 
5.3 Cloud Transaction History 
Upon inspections of the directory listings, we identified 
the sync folders’ initialisation/addition timestamps from 
the creation times of the ‘.syncany’ sub-directory. 
From the ‘FILEVERSION_FULL’ table of the 
%.syncany%/db/local.db database, we observed that rec-
ords of the last modified and updated timestamps could 
be located for the sync directories/files (file tree) associat-
ed with the repository in the ‘LASTMODIFIED’ and ‘UP-
DATED’ table fields, respectively. Sync directories/files 
that were modified could be differentiated from the 
‘VERSION’ table column given the value of more than 1. 
Additionally, the table holds the directory/file modifica-
tion status in the ‘STATUS’ table field, indicating whether 
a sync directory/file is newly added (with the value 
‘NEW’), modified (‘CHANGED;), or deleted (‘DELET-
ED’). We could also determine the machine names for the 
clients that made changes to the sync data (e.g., add and 
remove sync folders or files) as well as the database local 
timestamps associated with the changes in the ‘DATA-
BASEVERSION_CLIENT’ and ‘DATA-
BASEVERSION_LOCALTIME’ table fields, respectively 
(see Fig. 2). 
Examination of the /%syncany%/logs/syncany.log re-
vealed the client application’s access timestamps as well 
as file creation, modification, and deletion timestamps of 
the sync folders/files. The log file also provided the direc-
tory paths for the sync folders/files alongside the corre-
sponding property information as detailed in TABLE 3. 
Further examination of the Windows client determined 
that the prefetch files could be differentiated from ‘SYN-
CANY-LATEST-X86_64-2.EXE-FDCA2B01.pf’. We recov-
ered information of forensic interest, such as the number 
of times the application has been loaded and the last run 
time from the prefetch files. We also located shortcuts to 
the loader files %Program Files 
(x86)%\Syncany\bin\launcher.vbs and %Program Files 
(x86)%\Syncany\unins000.exe at %ProgramData%\Microso
ft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Syncany\Syncany.lnk a
nd %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Prog
rams\Syncany\Uninstall Syncany.lnk (respectively), 
providing potential for alternative methods for identify-
ing the application installation and last run timestamps. 
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On the Ubuntu client, we could discern the installation 
timstamp from the Syslog entry “2015-10-01 18:32:39 in-
stall syncany:all <none> 0.4.6.alpha” in the dpkg log and 
“Oct  1 17:45:41 ubuntu AptDaemon.Worker: INFO: In-
stalling local package file: /home/UbuntuPc/Desktop/syncany-
latest.deb”. Analysis of the Zeitgeist database 
(/.local/share/zeistgeist/activity.sqlite) revealed the current 
directory paths for the sync folders/files in the ‘subj_url’ 
and ‘subj_current_uri’ table fields of the ‘event_view’ ta-
ble, as well as original directory paths for the sync fold-
ers/files in the ‘subj_origin_uri’ table field. This suggest-
ed that if a sync (download) file has been moved from the 
sync folder, there will still be records remaining in the 
Zeitgeist database to enable identification of the sync 
files. The Zeitgeist database also held the types of actions 
made to the folders/files of relevance (e.g., Access, Cre-
ate, Move, Leave, and Delete), alongside the timestamps 
associated with the actions; each action created a record 
in the ‘interpretation’ table field. Analysis of the Gnome’s 
/home/<User Profile>/.local/share/recently-used.xbel log locat-
ed caches of sync directory paths accessed by the client 
application, which included the last added, modified, and 
 
Fig. 2. Portion of the ‘FILEVERSION_FULL’ table recovered in our research. 
 
TABLE 3 
ENTRIES OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN SYNCANY.LOG 
Relevance Examples of log entries 
Assists a practitioner in the identifica-
tion of the username for the backend 
storage. 
 1-10-15 18:52:20.274 | PluginSettingsP | main           | INFO : Setting field 'username' with value 'syn-
canyserver' 
Assists a practitioner in identifying the 
repository initiation time for a sync 
folder as well as the directory path and 
repository URL. 
 1-10-15 18:52:27.196 | ManagementReque | main           | SEVE : Executing InitOperation for folder 
/home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient ... 
 1-10-15 18:52:34.807 | WebdavTransferM | IntRq/SyncanyU | INFO : WebDAV: Uploading local file 
/home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/.syncany/master to 
http://172.16.38.180/webdav/UbuntuRepo/master ...  
Assists a practitioner in identifying the 
time when a sync folder is connected to 
an existing repository, including the 
directory path. 
 1-10-15 19:32:38.646 | ManagementReque | main           | SEVE : Executing ConnectOperation for folder 
/home/suspectpc/SyncanyWindowsDownloadToUbuntu . 
May provide a practitioner with the 
addition, modified and updated 
timesstamps for a sync file as well as 
the property information such as 
filename and modification counter 
(similarly to the records in the ‘FILE-
VERSION_FULL’ table of the 
%.syncany%/db/local.db database). 
 1-10-15 19:26:14.015 | Indexer         | Thread-68      | INFO :    * Added file version:    FileVersion [ver-
sion=1, path=Enron3111.zip, type=FILE, status=NEW, size=30967, lastModified=Sat Dec 13 08:35:00 PST 
2014, linkTarget=null, checksum=75a666ba87fef0f8425a71edcd621d0a4367aa47, updated=Thu Oct 01 
19:26:14 PDT 2015, posixPermissions=rw-r--r--, dosAttributes=--a-] 
May provide a practitioner with the 
addition, modified and updated 
timestamps for a sync folder as well as 
the property information such as 
filename and modification counter 
(similarly to the records in the ‘FILE-
VERSION_FULL’ table of the 
%.syncany%/db/local.db database). 
 1-10-15 19:42:18.751 | FileSystemActio | NotifyThread   | INFO :     with winning version   : FileVersion 
[version=1, path=WindowsToUbuntu, type=FOLDER, status=NEW, size=4096, lastModified=Mon Sep 28 
21:40:44 PDT 2015, linkTarget=null, checksum=null, updated=Thu Oct 01 19:42:10 PDT 2015, posixPermis-
sions=rwxr-xr-x, dosAttributes=----] 
Enables a practitioner in determining 
the deletion time of a sync folder. 
 1-10-15 20:14:17.091 | AppIndicatorTra | PySTDIN        | INFO : Python Input Stream: Removing folder 
'/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient' ... 
By searching for the ‘file’ tag, a practi-
tioner can identify the filenames asso-
ciated with a sync folder.  
 1-10-15 19:26:17.032 | AppIndicatorTra | Timer-0        | INFO : Sending message: <updateRecentChang-
esGuiInternalEvent> 
 <recentChanges> 
<file>/home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.zip</file> 
<file>/home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.txt</file> 
<file>/home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.rtf</file> 
… 
   </recentChanges> 
</updateRecentChangesGuiInternalEvent> 
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visited timestamps in the ‘bookmark’ property. Fig. 4 
shows that the directory paths as well as last added, mod-
ified, and added timestamps could be differentiated from 
the ‘href’, ‘visited’, ‘modified’, and ‘added’ entries in the 
‘bookmark’ property. The figure also illustrates that the 
Gnome’s log records the number of times the client appli-
cation has accessed a sync folder in the ‘count’ entry of 
the ‘bookmark:applications’ property. 
5.4 Data Storage 
The sync directories could be discerned from directories 
containing the hidden ‘.syncany’ directory. Analysis of 
the thumbnail cache located thumbnail images for the 
synced files in %Ap-
pData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer\ and 
/home/<User Profile>/.cache/thumbnails/large/ of the Win-
dows and Ubuntu clients (respectively). The thumbnail 
cache could be differentiated from the thumbnail header 
property ‘jtEXtThumb::URI file:’ that referenced the direc-
tory path for the sync folder in the latter. The files deleted 
(locally and remotely) could be recovered from the unal-
located space/partition. 
5.5 Network Analysis 
Our findings from network analysis revealed that the IP 
address of the Syncany server using the WebDAV proto-
col as the backend storage could be differentiated from 
the network packets of the PROPFIND HTTP method 
“PROPFIND /webdav/<Repo Name>/actions/ HTTP/1.1”. 
Analysis of the network payload of the PROPFIND HTTP 
method determined that the last creation and modified 
times of the repositories could be recovered from the ‘cre-
ationdate’ and ‘getlastmodified’ entries of the ‘prop’ 
property (see Fig. 3). 
Further examination of the network traffic recovered 
the master key salt of the repositories from the HTTP 
methods “PUT /webdav/<Repo Name>/master HTTP/1.1” 
and “GET /webdav/<Repo Name>/master HTTP/1.1”. Since 
the master key salt is only created (once) during the re-
pository initialisation or connection, the timestamp of 
which could reflect the sync folder creation or addition 
time. 
Undertaking data carving of the network traffic pro-
duced the repositories uploaded to or downloaded from 
the backend storage intact. However, the repositories 
were fully encrypted by default, and viewing the data in 
the repositories requires access to the client application 
and user password. 
5.6 Memory Analysis 
The findings from the ‘pslist’ function of Volatility 
showed that the process name was masqueraded with 
‘java.exe’. However, we could differentiate the PID from 
the last used PID recorded in the daemon.pid and syn-
cany.log files. Other process information was also recov-
ered such as the process identifier (PID), parent process 
identifier (PPID), as well as process initiation and termi-
nation times. Examinations of the memory dumps using 
the ‘netscan’ or ‘netstat’ function of Volatility recovered 
 
Fig. 3. An excerpt of the response body of the PROFIND HTTP method for the Syncany repository. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Portion of the recently-used.xbel log for the Syncany Ubuntu client application. 
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the network socket records associated with the Syncany 
processes such as the server and clients’ IP addresses, 
port numbers, and socket states, which could be useful 
supporting information for network analysis. 
Undertaking data carving of the memory space of the 
Syncany daemon process recovered files of forensic inter-
est, such as config.xml, syncany.log and local.db data-
base, intact. The presence of the data remnants in plain 
text also suggested that it is possible to recover the texts 
from the files by searching for the file entries of relevance 
(see Sections 5.1-5.3 for details). We also found that the 
%.syncany%/config.xml file could be potentially carved 
using the header and footer values of “3C 63 6F 6E 66 69 
67 3E…3C 2F 63 6F 6E 6E 65 63 74 69 6F 6E 3E 0A 3C 2F 
63 6F 6E 66 69 67 3E” in hex format or “<con-
fig>...</connection>.</config>” in non-Unicode string 
format, but such capability might not be present in a fu-
ture release of the software. As for the records from the 
‘FILEVERSION_FULL’ table of the local.db database, a 
search for the machine name (identified from the 
%.syncany%/config.xml file) could enable future searches 
of the raw cell data in the physical memory dump. 
6 EVIDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF THE SYNCANY UB-
UNTU SERVER 
From the examination of the Ubuntu server, we deter-
mined that the repositories hosted using the WebDAV 
protocol could be located in /var/www/webdav/<Repo 
Name>/. Within the repositories, we found copies of the 
databases and multichunks of synced files uploaded by 
the clients in the ‘databases’ and ‘multichunks’ directo-
ries, but the data were fully encrypted. At the time of this 
research, it appears that there is no method outside the 
Syncany client available to reconstruct the data in the re-
pository. Hence, accessing the sync data is only possible 
with the client application. As the Syncany storage cloud 
service is server independent, we determined that it is 
also possible to reconstruct the sync data from the reposi-
tories outside the server environment. This involves the 
following steps: 
1. Make a logical copy of a repository on the 
backend storage in a forensically sound manner. 
2. Install the Syncany client application on a third-
party workstation. 
3. Extract copy of the repository from the forensic 
image to the forensic workstation. 
4. Run the Syncany application on the third-party 
workstation, and set up a sync folder from the 
repository using the “sy connect” command or 
choosing the “Add an existing Syncany folder” 
option on the GUI. It should be noted that the 
process may require the user password to be en-
tered before the sync folder can be created.  
An inspection of the Apache access log 
/var/log/apache2/access.log showed that the log entries of 
the HTTP requests made by the Syncany clients to the 
WebDAV backend storage were in the format “<Client’s 
IP address> - <Username for the backend storage> [The time 
when a request was received] "<Request line>" <Status code> 
<Size of the object uploaded or downloaded by the client to the 
backend storage> " –" "<User agent>"”. Since the the sync 
files were uploaded in multichunks and the filenames 
were not visible, we could only estimate the timestamps 
of cloud transaction events in relation to a repository 
based on the requests made to the ‘multichunks’ directory 
of the repository. Having said that, we were able to de-
termine the initialisation time for a repository based on 
the HTTP request for the masterkey salt “172.16.38.132 - 
syncanyserver [01/Oct/2015:18:52:34 -0700] "PUT 
/webdav/UbuntuRepo/master HTTP/1.1" 201 480 "-" "Sar-
dine/UNAVAILABLE"” i.e., only available during initiali-
sation or connection of a repository. 
7 REPORTING AND PRESENTATION 
A timeline of the data from the various sources was out-
lined to demonstrate the cloud transactions from the cli-
ents and the server (see TABLE 4). To fully present the 
complete timeline of the analysis, we would need to use a 
visualisation software (we refer interested reader to 
[44],[73] for a recent review of forensic visualization liter-
ature, and a proof of concept for a three-stage forensic 
data storage and visualization life cycle). Therefore, we 
only present the timeline for the Enron3111.txt sample file 
from the Ubuntu client. 
8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we presented an investigation approach for 
Syncany, a cloud-enabled big data private cloud storage 
service, with the aim of reducing the time and resources 
required in a real-world investigation. We demonstrated 
that artefacts of the file synchronisation, file management, 
authentication, and encryption metadata could be recov-
ered from the folder-specific ‘.syncany’ directory on the 
desktop clients. In practice, the presence of the folder-
specific ‘.syncany’ directory could also prove useful for 
the identification of the sync directories from the directo-
ry listing, as well as other file system transaction logs 
such as shortcuts, event logs, $LogFile, $MFT, $UsnJrnl, 
registry (‘RecentDocs’, ‘UserAssist’, ‘Run’, and 
‘ComDig32’ etc.), Zeitgeist and recently-used.xbel logs, 
and thumbnail cache. 
Our examination of the physical memory indicated that 
the memory dumps is a potential alternative for recover-
ing the application caches, logs, and other authentication 
and encryption metadata available in the configuration 
and log files in plain text. However, the user password 
was not located on both the storage media and memory 
dumps, suggesting that a practitioner can only obtain the 
user password via an offline brute-force/dictionary attack 
or directly from the user. Nevertheless, a practitioner 
must keep in mind that memory changes frequently ac-
cording to user activities and will be wiped as soon as the 
system is shut down, and hence should be undertaken as 
quickly as possible to increase the likelihood of preserv-
ing the artefacts. 
Analysis of the network traffic produced unique identi-
fiable information such as URL references to the reposito-
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ries and HTTP requests associated with the cloud transac-
tion events. It was also possible to recover copies of the 
repositories uploaded to and downloaded from the 
backend storage intact, but the data were not human 
readable even with the use of HTTP protocol. This is, 
perhaps, not surprising as the data are fully encrypted 
locally before being uploaded to the backend storage [61]. 
However, we remark that the artefacts may vary accord-
ing to network protocol implementations i.e., if the 
HTTPS protocol is used, then the HTTP requests will be 
fully encrypted. 
As expected, examination of the Syncany server 
demonstrated that the repositories were fully encrypted 
on the backend storage, and it appeared that accessing the 
sync data is only possible with the client application. The 
ability to reconstruct the repository outside the cloud 
hosting environment suggested that a practitioner can 
undertake logical acquisition of the repositories in the 
event where physical acquisition is not feasible. Our re-
search also demonstrated that the web application log 
could be a source of information on the logical locations 
of the clients, and hence should be collected whenever 
practical. A summary of artefacts of interest with the Syn-
cany private cloud storage service is presented in TABLE 
5. 
Collectively, our research highlighted the challenges 
that could arise during forensic investigations of cloud-
enabled big data solutions. While the use of deduplica-
tion/chunking and encryption technologies can benefit 
users by providing an efficient and secure means for 
managing big data, evidence collection and analysis may 
necessitate intercepting and collecting of password and 
utilisation of other vendor-specific applications. This can 
be subject to potential abuse by cyber criminals seeking to 
hide their tracks. Without the cooperation of the user 
(suspect), forensics endeavours may end up an exercise in 
futility. Therefore, we suggest vendors implement a fo-
rensically friendly logging mechanism (e.g., providing 
information about who accesses the data, what data has 
been accessed, from where did the user access the data, 
and when did the user access the data) that supports the 
collection of the raw log data outside the encrypted da-
TABLE 4 
TIMELINE FOR SYNCANY FORENSICS 
Source Key Date Event Type Comment 
Autopsy file List 2015-10-01 01:14:41 Created Created directory /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient. 
Autopsy file list 2015-10-01 10:26:10 Created Created file /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.txt. 
Dpkg log 2015-10-01 18:32:39 Created Installed Syncany Ubuntu client application version 0.4.6.alpha (i.e., “2015-10-01 18:32:39 
install syncany:all <none> 0.4.6.alpha”). 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 18:34:12 Last run Last run Syncany client application (i.e., 1-10-15 18:34:12.064 | DaemonOperation | Thread-5       
| INFO : Starting daemon operation with action RUN ....) 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 18:52:27 Initialised Initialised the repository for sync directory /home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient (i.e., “1-10-
15 18:52:27.196 | ManagementReque | main           | SEVE : Executing InitOperation for folder 
/home/suspectpc/SyncanyUbuntuClient…”). 
Autopsy file list 2015-10-01 18:52:28 Initialised Initialised the repository for sync directory /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient (i.e., 
created /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/.syncany). 
local.db 2015-10-01 19:26:14 Created Locally added sync file /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.txt. 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 19:26:14 Added Added sync file /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/Enron3111.txt (i.e., “1-10-15 
19:26:14.004 | Indexer         | Thread-68      | INFO :    * Added file version:    FileVersion [ver-
sion=1, path=Enron3111.txt, type=FILE, status=NEW, size=2734, lastModified=Sat Dec 13 
08:33:11 PST 2014, linkTarget=null, checksum=ceadc4b7d47af4125a68e03ec3141cb3fde407ff, 
updated=Thu Oct 01 19:26:14 PDT 2015, posixPermissions=rw-r--r--, dosAttributes=--a-]”). 
local.db 2015-10-01 19:42:10 Created Node ‘WindowsPc’ (Machine Name=‘PqPKcLWznojHZVLslgNo’) uploaded sync folder 
/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu. 
local.db 2015-10-01 19:42:10 Created Node ‘WindowsPc’ (Machine Name=‘PqPKcLWznojHZVLslgNo’) uploaded sync file 
/home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt. 
Autopsy file list 2015-10-01 19:42:18 Created Created sync directory /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu. 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 19:42:18 Added Added sync folder /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu (i.e., “1-10-15 
19:42:18.751 | FileSystemActio | NotifyThread   | INFO :     with winning version   : FileVersion 
[version=1, path=WindowsToUbuntu, type=FOLDER, status=NEW, size=4096, lastModi-
fied=Mon Sep 28 21:40:44 PDT 2015, linkTarget=null, checksum=null, updated=Thu Oct 01 
19:42:10 PDT 2015, posixPermissions=rwxr-xr-x, dosAttributes=----]”). 
syncany.log 2015-10-01 19:42:18 Added Added sync file /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt 
(i.e., “1-10-15 19:42:18.848 | FileSystemActio | NotifyThread   | INFO :    + NewFileSys-
temAction [file1=null, file2=FileVersion [version=1, path=WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt, 
type=FILE, status=NEW, size=2734, lastModified=Sat Dec 13 08:33:11 PST 2014, 
linkTarget=null, checksum=ceadc4b7d47af4125a68e03ec3141cb3fde407ff, updated=Thu Oct 01 
19:42:10 PDT 2015, posixPermissions=rw-r--r--, dosAttributes=--a-]]”). 
Autopsy file List 2015-10-01 19:42:18 Created Created sync file /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt. 
Autopsy file list; 
Trashinfo 
2015-10-01 19:48:29 Deleted Deleted sync file /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt. 
local.db 2015-10-01 19:48:32 Deleted Deleted sync file /home/UbuntuPc/SyncanyUbuntuClient/WindowsToUbuntu/Enron3111.txt. 
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tasets by default. In a recent work, for example, Ab Rah-
man et al. [58] highlighted the importance of forensic-by-
design and presented a conceptual forensic-by-design 
framework. 
Future work would include extending this study to 
other private cloud storage services such as Seafile to 
have an up-to-date and comprehensive forensic under-
standing and facilitate in greening investigation of big 
data platforms. 
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